Review essay

Field theory in comparative context: A new paradigm for media studies

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Via the English-language translation of *La Distinction*, Pierre Bourdieu's approach to the reception and appropriation of cultural objects is already well known. But English-speaking scholars have yet to profit fully from Bourdieu's work on cultural production, particularly as it relates to the news media.[1] Bourdieu and research associates including Alain Accardo, Patrick Champagne, Rémi Lenoir, Dominique Marchetti, and Louis Pinto develop a new paradigm for the sociology of journalism centered around the concept of the "media field."[2] Their basic thesis is that as journalism has become less autonomous from the economic field, its influence and pervasiveness have also increased. The news media, serving as an agent of dominant power, are undermining the autonomy of other spheres of cultural production, and thus the optimal social conditions for the production of scientific knowledge and artistic innovation.

In service of this intellectual project, Bourdieu and associates contribute to the Anglo-American tradition of news media research in at least three important ways. First, the focus on the mezzo-level of the "field" offers both a theoretical and empirical bridge between the traditionally separated macro-"societal" level models of the news media, such as political economy, hegemony, cultural and technological theories, and micro-"organizational" approaches. Second, in contrast to research that concentrates on either news organizations or audiences, but rarely both, their field theory focuses on the links between the two. Moreover, it challenges the dichotomy of "passive" versus "active" audiences, insisting on the pre-established harmony of circuits of production and reception. Third, field theory highlights processes of change, both how the media field itself is transformed and how a reconfigured media field affects other major societal sectors. Finally, and in contrast to the Anglo-American tendency to separate serious research and political

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engagement,[3] Bourdieu, Champagne, and others propose and implement a concrete program of political and intellectual action to remedy the social ills they identify.

I begin by placing the model of the media field in the context of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of fields, capital, and habitus. I then illustrate the media field approach by analyzing several field case studies, most not yet available in English translation. Through systematic comparison with other approaches to media research, I conclude by highlighting the unique contributions offered by the field theory, while pointing out what I argue are some still unresolved difficulties.

Theoretical framework

Fields and the conflict between heteronomy and autonomy

The starting point for understanding the media field paradigm is Pierre Bourdieu's general theory of fields (*champs*). Drawing on and modifying Weber's sociology of religion, Bourdieu sees society as differentiated into a number of semi-autonomous fields (e.g., fields of politics, economics, religion, cultural production, etc.) governed by their own "rules of the game" and offering their own particular economy of exchange and reward, yet whose basic oppositions and general structures parallel each other. These binary oppositions are reflections and refractions of the overall class division in society, between the dominant and dominated classes, but also the split within the dominant class, between dominant economic and political power on the one hand and dominated cultural power on the other. That is, society is structured around a basic opposition between "economic" and "cultural" power, with the latter generally being weaker but, as in Weber, influential to the extent that it legitimates and masks economic wealth. Reproducing this larger societal division between the "economic" and "cultural" poles, each field is structured around the opposition between the "heteronomous" pole representing economic and political capital (forces external to the field) and the "autonomous" pole representing the specific *capital* unique to that field (e.g., artistic or scientific or other species of cultural capital).

Fields, then, can be differentiated both according to the kinds of specific capital that are valued therein and by their degree of relative autonomy from each other and in particular from the dominant economic and

political fields. No field is entirely autonomous, although mathematics and poetry are perhaps closest to the ideal. In the scientific field, autonomy means that scholars are able to pursue research and then be judged by their peers according to standards based purely on scientific reason. In Bourdieu's model, total domination exists when one field dominates all others and thus there exists only one acceptable "definition of human accomplishment" for the entire society.[4] A field's autonomy is to be valued because it provides the pre-conditions for the full creative process proper to each field and ultimately resistance to the "symbolic violence" exerted by the dominant system of hierarchization.

The news media in the larger field of power

The first step toward understanding how and why journalism functions as it does is to locate it vis-à-vis other fields. This is accomplished through the method of social "mapping," which combines ethnographic observation and statistical analysis to break with common-sense understanding of the social world and, thus, from the distance afforded by the scientific gaze construct an "objective" picture of the social world. Objective in this case, however, does not mean the total picture of reality: For the understanding to be complete, as I explain below, it must be joined with an analysis of the constitution of the particular subjectivities of the actors in the field.

Following the technique utilized by media field researchers, we first attempt to locate the journalistic field in its most immediate environment, which is the field of cultural production.[5] This is the field in which various sorts of writers, artists, musicians, and scientists engage in symbolic production. The field of cultural production is part of the field of power, that is, the field at the dominant pole of the all-encompassing field of social classes. But following from the current historical situation in which economic capital dominates cultural capital, the field of cultural production is dominated in turn by those fields closest to economic power, the economic and political fields. Within the field of cultural production, this hierarchy of power is reproduced, with some fields lying closer to the economic pole than others.

The field of cultural production is divided between the field of restricted production (produced for other producers, that portion of the field closest to the cultural pole – small literary journals, avant-garde art and music, etc.) and the field of large-scale production (produced



Figure 1. The structural location of journalism.

for general audiences, that portion of the field closest to the economic pole – mass entertainment, etc.).[6] The journalistic field is mostly inside the field of large-scale production, and thus situated closer to the heteronomous pole of economic and political power. (Figure 1 shows journalism's precise structural location: Moving from left to right, the proportion of economic capital (CE) to cultural capital (CC) increases. Moving from bottom to top, the total volume of capital, either cultural or economic, increases.)[7]

Field theory further locates journalism in its immediate structural environment, the ensemble of fields – politics, social sciences, and journalism – that compete to "impos[e] ... the legitimate vision of the social world."[8] The media field's "mediating" role – its unique mandate to enter into and explore other fields, and then publicly share its findings – allows it actively to influence the relations of power throughout contemporary societies. Champagne attributes the journalistic field's "ambiguous position" in the field of power to the fact that journalism is powerful in its effects, but by reason of this power is strongly dominated by the economic and political fields.[9]

To conceptualize the location of other fields in the field of power, one must imagine Figure 1 as three-dimensional. Thus, hovering above the field of cultural production, but moving progressively closer to the right side of the field of power as the proportion of economic capital to cultural capital increases, are the fields of the university, professions (law, medicine, etc.), national government bureaucracy, politics, and economics.[10] We would then see, for example, that a position in homologous locations in the bureaucracy and journalism contains the same proportion of cultural to economic capital, and the same overall volume of capital. Yet, since these positions exist in different fields with their own specific logic, they are not reducible to each other. Under certain conditions, such as when the occupant (individual or organizational) has a similar *disposition* due to comparable social trajectory, these homologous positions will tend to produce similar kinds of tastes, actions, and opinions. Field theory would predict that readers of *Le Monde*, for instance, would tend to occupy homologous positions in the university, bureaucratic, political, and economic fields.

Fields and struggles for distinction

In addition to the division between heteronomy and autonomy, the field of journalism (as with all other fields) is structured around the opposition between the "old" and the "new." Through analysis of new entrants into a field, media field researchers also add an important dynamic element to the model, showing how the "objective" structure is related to the "subjective" perspectives of individual agents. Objective structures and subjective experiences are not two competing explanations of the social world but are rather two intertwined aspects of reality. The complexity, capacities, and character of any particular agent is due not to his or her submission to or freedom from the effects of a field, but rather to the particularity of any life's trajectory within and through a series of fields. Put another way, society consists of "objective histories" embodied in systems, organizations, codes, and hierarchies, and "histories incorporated in habitus," which are "personal dispositions toward sensing, perceiving, thinking, acting, according to models interiorized in the course of different processes of socialization."[11] Thus, the social scientific study of journalistic production, why a certain story is chosen and written in a certain way, is a process of detailing the convergence of "disposition" (*habitus*) and "position" (structural location within a field).

For field theory, both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of demographic change in a field are crucial. A rapid influx of new agents into the field can serve both as a force for transformation and for conservation. At the managerial or organizational level, new agents can only establish themselves by marking their difference with those already in the field, and thus they have the greatest incentive to found a new kind of press outlet or adopt a distinctive editorial voice. Quantity of new entrants relative to available positions, however, is also important, particularly at the entry levels. Increased competition for scarce jobs tends to make journalists more cautious and conformist, contributing to simple reproduction of the field.[12] But it is important to point out that these morphological changes are crucially mediated by the internal logic of each field and thus the same demographic stimulus may produce entirely different kinds of effects across a range of fields.

As Alain Accardo stresses, it is also essential to examine *who* is entering the field – what are their social/economic origins, where did they go to school and receive professional training, and how did they rise in the profession? Changes in the class composition of new entrants can be one source of dynamism in the field, though more likely via downward than upward mobility.[13] The extent to which higher education and professional training increases the autonomy of the field or aids the forces of heteronomy is an empirical question. The growth of journalism schools has helped solidify and diffuse professional journalistic standards.[14] At the same time, organization of these schools along the "American model" of narrow technical skills divorced from critical intellectual training has made journalists less likely to question the status quo.[15] An increase in the number of elite French journalists who have studied at the exclusive Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris ("Sciences-po"), also attended by a good share of the nation's future government officials and business leaders, has also conceivably further lessened future journalists' inclination to adopt a critical stance toward the dominant political viewpoints. Comparable developments, of course, could be examined in other national contexts.

In general, then, entry into the journalistic field requires acceptance of the basic rules of the game, which themselves are a powerful force of inertia. Thus, while the opposition "old-new" has the potential to transform the balance of power between heteronomy-autonomy within the field, and ultimately the larger societal structure of class relations, it is only under certain conditions. But to understand how these conditions

are produced and with what effects, we must first examine in greater depth the internal dynamics of the journalistic field.

The French field of journalism

The distinction between (relatively) large-scale and (relatively) restrained production is reproduced within the journalistic field (television versus print), within each medium (the private TF 1 versus the public Arte[16]), and within each media enterprise (front page political news versus the specialized "rubriques" of the inside pages).[17] Thus, it is difficult to speak of journalism *tout court*, because in fact, there are marked differences within the journalistic field, depending on how close a media outlet, news desk (metro, culture, business, etc.), or individual journalist is to either the autonomous or heteronomous poles.

What can and does change is the relative "attraction" of the two poles. Bourdieu uses the metaphor of Einsteinian physics: "The more a body has energy, the more it deforms the space around it. A very powerful agent in a field can deform all the space, force all the other space to organize itself around it."[18] In more concrete terms, media power is ultimately the power to "consecrate," that is, name an event, person, or idea as worthy of wider consideration. In a democratic society, a relatively wide range of stories and ideas appear somewhere. Only a handful, however, are picked up by the entire press and attract widespread public attention.[19] The extent to which a particular medium or media enterprise is able to exercise such consecrating power is an indicator of its relative weight within the field.

Field theory's two-fold analysis – of the shifting relationship between heteronomous and autonomous power, and of the changing demographics of new entrants into the journalistic field – produces the following historical narrative of post-war transformations of the French journalism field: Until the 1970s, the journalism field was strongly marked by a division between "serious" journalism produced for elite audiences and "popular" journalism produced for mass audiences. Cheap sensationalistic newspapers arose in the mid- to late nineteenth century. Their reach was broad, though not national, and their credibility was low. This is not to say that circulation is not important to a newspaper's influence. But journals able to exercise powerful effects on the political field had to combine relatively high circulation with journalistic excellence. Thus, the elite, serious press maintained a largely

unchallenged power to legitimize (or not) stories that appeared in the popular, party, and alternative press. After the Second World War, *Le Figaro*, and later *Le Monde*, wielded this kind of power in France. Because of this ultimate veto on the excesses of the popular press, commercial but serious journals pulled the journalism field as a whole closer to the intellectual pole, despite the fact that journalism depended then as now on paying readers and advertisers. Under this regime, the dominant definition of the "good journalist" was someone who emphasized the accuracy of facts, earned the respect of his or her peers, and refused scoops and sensationalism.[20]

Until at least the mid-1970s, French television and radio, despite their massive audiences, could not challenge the pre-eminent consecrating power of the serious print press. The audio-visual media, as the French call them, were controlled by the state and thus both in fact and in the eyes of the public and other journalists were more a part of the political field than of the journalistic field. Advertising was not introduced on French television until 1968 and steadily increased during the 1970s. Mitterrand's opening up of the audio-visual sector to allow new commercial stations in 1982, culminating in the 1987 privatization of TF1, dramatically changed the balance of forces within the journalistic field. Privatization raised television journalism's credibility with the public and at the same time increased commercial pressures on television to maintain high audience shares. With greater credibility and far larger audiences than the old popular press, television can accomplish what the popular press was never able to do: bring powerful and "legitimate" commercial pressure into the heart of the journalistic field and thus pull the entire media field away from the intellectual pole toward the commercial pole.

In contrast to the serious print media, television's power "rests not in the intrinsic quality of its journalistic product." Rather its power lies in its wide, nearly universal diffusion, which gives it unparalleled capacity to shape opinion and makes it so highly valued by politicians. In the new commercial television-dominated media regime, the "good journalist" is the one who attracts the biggest audience or readership.[21] This is not to say that the serious press no longer wields influence, nor that the intellectual standards it upheld have disappeared. It is only to say that television has become a competing, and ultimately dominant, consecrating power. Television's increased "weight" is evident in the fact that the number of pages devoted to television coverage has increased in the print press (even in *Le Monde*), that television journal-

ists are increasingly respected within the journalistic field (for example, one French television announcer was subsequently named the editor of a major news magazine), and that news reported by television, even if it would have been in the first instance ignored by the print press, often becomes an "event" simply by virtue of appearing on television and thus must be reported by the print press.[22] Moreover, commercial television no longer always bows to the news judgments of the serious print press.

Television has, in summary, modified the "circulation of information" within the media field, that is, which stories and which kind of stories get picked up and become "media events" and which stories remain on the inside pages or in the small alternative journals. Moreover, because it has offered a competing definition of good journalism measured in audience ratings, it has broken down the old dichotomy between "serious" and "popular" journalism, undermining the power of the old intellectual standards to guide the behavior of journalists. But perhaps the most far-reaching effect, as I detail below, has been the ways in which a television-dominated journalistic field has imposed its commercial logic on the other fields in the field of cultural production, such as the judiciary, philosophy, and medical research, and on the political field. Because fields are closely intertwined and because journalism in particular is a crucial mediator among all fields, as the journalistic field has become more commercialized and thus more homologous (more overlapping) with the economic field, it increases the power of the heteronomous pole within each of the fields, producing a convergence among all the fields and pulling them closer to the commercial pole in the larger field of power. (In Figure 2, as journalism becomes more closely aligned with the economic field, its total volume of capital [the vertical axis] increases and its proportion of economic to cultural capital also increases [the horizontal axis]. Thus, from the 1970s to the 1990s, journalism moves upward and rightward in the field, bringing the other fields along with it. Figure 2 also shows a relative decline in the overall capital volume of the political and university fields.)[23]

Journalism's influence on society: Three "field case studies"

Philosophy and the scientific academy

For the relatively autonomous scientific and cultural fields, contemporary journalism is like a Trojan horse, warily granted admission



Figure 2. French field of power.

inside the fields' walls only to provide crucial support to those inside agents closest to the heteronomous pole who seek to overturn the existing hierarchies.[24] In part, such invasions are due to the purely intellectual aspects of journalism, a generalized intellectualism with an interest in breaking down specialized academic enclaves and celebrating those public intellectuals closest to its own amateur eclecticism. It is television that has helped give journalism a wider reach and capacity to transform the fields with which it interacts. The original source of these field transformations, however, lies not with the media, but with broad demographic and social changes rooted in the post-war expansion of the French university system and the creation of a "reserve army" of unemployed cultural workers.[25] This has created incentives within a number of specialized fields for young agents unable to advance via the consecration of their peers to use the mass media as "a weapon in their internal battles with the guardians of orthodoxy."[26]

The field of philosophy, examined by Louis Pinto, has been the most visible and significant battleground in which the mass media have served to redefine the meaning and scope of intellectual power in France. Since the end of World War II and accelerating since the 1960s, philosophy has seen its dominant intellectual position decline as social scientific disciplines useful to economic and political power have risen in prestige and importance. At the same time, philosophy retains in France a certain moral authority to speak truth to power. As in any field, one's response to external threats to the value of the cultural capital prevalent within a field depend on one's position in the field. Those closest to the autonomous pole, who have received the consecration of their peers, responded to the crisis of philosophy through the "fierce and desperate perpetuation of the scholarly principles to which they owe their intellectual existence."[27] In contrast, those closest to the heteronomous pole, often the young or those marginally employed on the margins of academia, had an interest in creating a new definition of philosopher and a new purpose for philosophy. At the same time that the expanding university system had created too many candidates for too few academic jobs, it had also created a vast new educated public for philosophical writings, especially those of an intermediate level of difficulty and connected to the large issues of the day.[28] *Le Monde* and the weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur* helped resolve this crisis, in the process changing the balance of power within the philosophical field, by defining, locating, and celebrating a new generation of "worldly philosophers" such as Bernard-Henry Lévy, Alain Finkielkraut, and André Glucksmann. The consecration of worldly philosophy by these serious press outlets not only served their interests in expanding readership, but also affirmed the journalists' own in-between intellectual status.

For these media-philosophers and other intellectuals who appear frequently in the media, Bourdieu has reserved the intentionally loaded word "collaborators."[29] Besides the polemical intent, the term derives from a Bourdieu-inspired study showing how during the Vichy regime those cultural producers with the greatest store of capital specific to their field were the most inclined to resist the authorities, while those most dependent on heteronomous capital were the most likely to collaborate.[30] From a certain perspective, field theorists' hostility to media intellectuals is part of the very phenomenon they analyze, that is, the steady rise of journalistic power over that of sociologists and other relatively independent intellectuals. In the past, Bourdieu recalls, French intellectuals such as Raymond Aron participated directly

in the media field but paid a price for it: Aron's credibility as a legitimate scholar, at least within France, was undermined. Intellectuals such as Sartre or Foucault also wrote for newspapers or political magazines occasionally, but generally had sufficient stature to set the terms of the relationship. In these encounters, journalists played respectful pupil to the intellectual as master teacher.[31] Now the situation has been reversed to the extent that journalists see themselves as the equals if not the superiors of intellectuals. As Bourdieu found when he appeared on the television newsmagazine *Arrêt sur images*, the television journalist "presenter" has nearly complete control of the content of the discussion, the time allotted for responses, and the non-verbal signals that convey either approval or opprobrium to the viewing audience.[32] The media thus promote and favor those intellectuals willing to play by the rules of media engagement: entertaining, light, and quick dialogue.

Thus it is not simply the content of television, but its rhythm and speed that produce effects. The "fast thinkers" favored by television only have time, even if they were not so inclined, to recycle those "received ideas" (*idées reçues*) that reflect and help reproduce the taken-for-granted status quo.[33] True philosophical and scientific reflection takes time to formulate and time to understand, precisely because such thought usually runs counter to our common sense. And so television degrades the public debate and censors the articulation of truly oppositional thought.

Field theory draws a parallel between the way that celebrity-intellectuals have used the media to bypass the scientific field and the way that demagogic political leaders (like *Front national* leader Jean-Marie Le Pen) have used the media to make an end run around the normal political process. Just as commerce corrodes and ultimately destroys science, political demagoguery and appeals to emotion are destructive of reasonable politics.[34]

But the danger is not just present within the media field, keeping out those intellectuals (or politicians) who won't play by the media's rules. The "*mentalité audimat*" is entering inside the walls of the academy, as media exposure and public notoriety are taken into account by French university hiring and tenure committees. Increasingly, media consecration is seen as equivalent to the professional consecration of one's peers. Bourdieu and his colleagues argue that this is having disastrous results, allowing less-qualified persons to enter the scholarly professions and undermining the enforcement of strict scientific standards.

The judiciary

Even more than the field of philosophy, the French judiciary has traditionally kept the press at arms length. Yet in 1992, *Le Monde* published a book entitled *Les Juges parlent* (The judges speak). Rémi Lenoir asks: Just who are these judges who speak? Far from representing some random sample of all judges, or even those judges most respected by their colleagues, the judges who speak are "those judges whom journalists speak about."[35]

The granting of speech to a formerly silent judiciary began during the 1960s when the overproduction of young jurists trained by the new *École nationale de la magistrature* clashed with the aging hierarchy who wanted to hold on to their privileged positions. This younger generation, by virtue of its new kind of professional preparation, also had different professional values (a different conception of the "good jurist") than the old guard. During the early 1970s, the new generation of jurists and especially those who were involved in the leftist *Syndicat de la magistrature* began cultivating a relationship with sympathetic young reporters at left-leaning dailies such as *Le Monde* and *Libération* and the weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*, whose own prestige and influence were growing along with the electoral prospects of the Socialist party.

Via the media, activist judges were able to bypass the normal procedures of censure within the judicial field and speak directly to political representatives outside of the field. Today, many of the former union leaders hold positions at or near the top of the profession. What has changed are the functions and prestige of positions at the bottom of the profession, notably the "*juge d'instruction*" (examining magistrate). Formerly a minor position, the sustained media alliance between young activist judges and reporters has raised its relative prestige and power, in the process pushing the entire field closer to the heteronomous pole and thus increasing the influence of media logic within the judiciary. Lenoir shows that media influence produced ambiguous results in the judicial field. Field theory, while often critical of media, is primarily a tool for dispassionately analyzing field dynamics and effects.

Medical research

In a third field case study, Champagne and Marchetti show how transformations in the journalistic field and its relations with the medical

field helped produce and magnify a late 1980s/early 1990s public scandal over AIDS-contaminated blood provided to young hemophiliacs in France.[36] The authors' basic argument, similar to the American problematic of "social problems,"[37] is that those aspects of the issue emphasized in the media were not necessarily the most significant or important, and that the media took as fact several aspects of the case that were strongly contested within the scientific community.

As in the other media field analyses, Champagne and Marchetti examine both societal "external" and journalistic "internal" dynamics, beginning with the most general and moving to the most specific. During the 1980s, the field of medicine became both more commercialized due to rising health care costs and more politicized, as the profession was forced to defend its share of public expenditures. Increases in the number of doctors intensified competition within the field and contributed further to this commercialization. "Patients" became "clients." These changes combined with an increasingly educated and sophisticated public to take doctors off their old pedestals and to demand greater accountability from the medical profession.

Within the journalistic field, a different set of changes was occurring. At the most general level, as noted, the print press was gradually losing its preeminence to commercial television. In concrete terms, this meant that the logic of the "Audimat" (France's equivalent of the Nielsen ratings), which tapped the instant preferences of the majority of the viewing public for dramatic, moving, and personal images, was replacing the logic of "institutional" news, which emphasized the policy agendas of the various government agencies.[38] Within the print press field, *Le Monde* had lost its near monopoly of consecrating power, as other serious but less stodgy dailies such as *Libération* (having adopted a new commercial formula in 1981, departing from the original activist mandate of such founders as Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir) and weeklies such as *L'Événement du Jeudi* set the standard with a more splashy, aggressive tone of coverage.

Finally, within the small field of medical journalism, an additional set of changes set the stage for the eventual public crisis over contaminated blood. Until the 1980s, medical journalism had been dominated by *Le Monde* and in particular by the newspaper's doctor-turned-journalist medical writer. The retirement of this long-time correspondent in 1985 combined with long-brewing external and internal changes – an oversupply of doctors that provided *Le Monde*'s competitors with their

own doctor correspondents, the decline of *Le Monde*'s overall dominance of the media field, a new climate of more intense competition for readers and advertisers, and the increasing media-savviness of medical researchers who competed among each other for press contacts – to produce a new economy of medical information.

This increased competition and division within the "specialized" sector of medical journalism undermined the capacity of specialists to place their expertise in opposition to the media "generalists" within the print sector and in television who saw in the contaminated blood affair not a complex scientific decision but a morally charged, emotional audience grabber. In the ensuing struggle over the dominant principle of hierarchization, the generalists who gradually took over coverage of the scandal, that is, succeeded in constructing the issue as a scandal, attempted to redefine the specialist-generalist distinction: whereas specialists simply reprint information given to them, the generalists value the information that must be "sought out." Yet this self-serving distinction hid another, Champagne and Marchetti argue, that of information that one understands and information that one does not understand. The generalists' ignorance of the most basic scientific aspects of the case left them unable to adjudicate fairly among the competing definitions of the problem, instead offering a conception of balance (rooted in political coverage but inappropriate for science) that gave voice to every dramatic or moving testimony, no matter how scientifically dubious. The generalist reporters would also magnify and ridicule every tentative hypothesis, such as testing the link between mosquitoes and HIV infection, undermining the capacity of researchers to conduct as broad a scientific investigation as possible. In theoretical terms, Champagne and Marchetti show how the increasing weight of the heteronomous pole in the media field strengthened the heteronomous pole within medicine, undermining the practice of medical research according to purely scientific principles.

Countering media power

Media field researchers do not simply offer a grim diagnosis of the news media and leave it at that: They argue that the first step toward change is to bring to consciousness the invisible structures of belief and practice that lead actors to unwittingly reproduce the system, even as they struggle within it. Only then can realistic action be achieved to change the situation. For instance, journalists who understand the

pernicious effects of competition over scoops may begin to cooperate in new ways to address public issues in more meaningful ways. News analysis shows could not only expand their "guest" list to include the relatively marginalized and disenfranchised, but offer a sort of affirmative action, actively helping non-media professionals to feel comfortable and giving them extra time to articulate their oppositional, and thus not quickly summarized, views.

Bourdieu and his colleagues insist that scholars have an obligation to make their research results available to the public, under "good conditions." Standards for entry into the social sciences should be raised and strictly maintained and researchers should frequently speak to audiences outside their field. Then, rather than Audimat-minded journalists and their "*bon client*" intellectuals trading pre-packaged remarks, "real" intellectuals, consecrated by their peers, should join together to take collective control of the diffusion of their own ideas. And rather than bring down one's message to the level of the lowest common denominator, educational efforts should be taken to raise the level of the audience's understanding. Bourdieu does not hesitate to put such a project in its grandest terms, that is:

> One must defend the conditions of production that are necessary to bring about progress toward the "universal" and at the same, one must work to generalize the conditions of access to the universal, to see to it that more and more people fulfill the conditions necessary to appropriate the universal.[39]

This anti-postmodernist credo on behalf of science and reason extends to Bourdieu's understanding of democracy, which is not the equivalent of instant consumer choices, but the "expression of an enlightened, rational collective opinion, of a public reason."[40]

To combat the media's symbolic violence with scientific reason and thus to alter the functioning of the journalistic field, media field researchers have sought to "intervene" directly in media-dominated public debates. *La misère du monde*, a thick compendium of research reports and direct testimonials on poverty and other forms of "social suffering" in France, was a best-seller and helped bring greater attention to issues ignored by the major political parties and the mainstream news media.[41] *Sur la télévision*, published by Bourdieu's independent publishing venture, *Liber-Raisons d'Agir*, was purposely kept brief to attract the widest possible audience. This "little red book" was a best-seller and prompted a firestorm of criticisms from journalists and intellectuals.

More recently, *Liber-Raisons d'Agir* published an inside "exposé" of the French news media by *Le Monde Diplomatique* journalist Serge Halimi. Similar to *Sur la télévision*, Halimi's "little yellow book" has been at the top of the French best-seller lists.[42]

Field theory in comparative context

To see the distinctiveness of the media field paradigm, I now contrast its major conceptual and methodological features with those of the currently dominant models of media research: cultural, technological, political economy, hegemony, and organizational (see Table I).[43]

The journalistic field: mapping the "mezzo"

First, as illustrated above, "field analysis" provides an analytical framework that bridges macro-societal and micro-organizational approaches, situating the journalistic field in relation to the larger field of power and explaining how external forces are translated into the semi-autonomous logic of the journalistic field. Field theory clearly distinguishes itself from "vulgar Marxist" political economy approaches that seek to explain the news media's behavior by sole reference to its capitalist ownership and control.[44] In similar manner, Bourdieu and his associates have spoken out against theorists, such as Régis Debray, who have overemphasized the influence of new technologies.[45]

Cultural approaches, though they are usually paired with other models, are analytically distinct from other approaches to the extent that they emphasize the overarching constraints of symbolic systems but downplay more mundane power struggles. Field theory's "structural constructivism" contrasts sharply with cultural semiotic approaches, represented by Roland Barthes and in much of Foucault, which fail to connect discourses to social structures. Bourdieu reserves his harshest criticisms, however, for the postmodern cultural theories of Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord, criticizing the latter's "society of the spectacle" as offering a "false cynical radicalism" that serves to suppress any real critique of the media.[46] A more empirically-oriented French cultural approach that portrays television as the "most democratic tool in democratic societies" is that of Dominique Wolton and Jean-Louis Missika.[7] From the perspective of field theory, however, Wolton and Missika's positivist approach and overly generous assessments of journalism's

Table 1. Field theory and other research models

Type	Major influences on news media behavior	Relation between production and reception of media messages	Focus on media and societal change?	Media effects on society
Cultural	National culture, symbolic systems	Passive audiences: Strong media conveys national culture	No Focus on reproduction	Reflect/reinforce national culture
Technological	Kinds of technologies (TV vs. print, etc.)	Passive audiences: Technologies transform consciousness	Yes But changes only come with dramatic changes in technologies	Change consciousness and social relations
Political economy	Capitalist control	Passive audiences: Capitalist media convey pro-capitalist messages	No Focus on reproduction	Reproduce capitalism
Hegemony	Economic-political system	Passive audiences (but audiences retain capacity to "resist" and "recode")	No Focus on reproduction	Reproduce hegemonic
Field theory	Semi-autonomous journalistic field which mediates outside economic and political influences Uniquely focuses on "mezzo-level" specific journalistic interests	Rejects passive-active dichotomy: Media producers and audiences are linked by relations of homology, thus a "preaching to converted" effect	Yes Economic, demographic and technological changes interacting with logic of media field and relations with other fields may produce change	Change (or reproduce) societal status hierarchies, undermine optimal social conditions for production of scientific knowledge, undermine democratic "reason" in political field
Organizational	Organizational constraints	Does not address audiences	Does not address change	Limit or distort the range of information provided to the public

role in society betray a lack of scientific and political independence from their object of research.[48]

At the other extreme of micro-level approaches, organizational theories tend to focus only on individual media organizations or sectors of the media. Organizational studies emphasize the bureaucratic constraints imposed on journalists by their employing organizations and by the official agencies who serve as their chief sources.[49] Field theory shares with the organizational approach a highly empirical approach and interest in the everyday practice of journalism. However, unlike most organizational studies, it takes care to relate particular media organizations to both their immediate institutional and broader societal environments.

Field theory's relationship to historically and institutionally-grounded cultural and hegemony models is more complex. The media field model takes seriously the constraining power of culture as it manifests itself in professional practices, traditions, and codes. In this regard, there is an affinity with Herbert Gans's concept of journalistic "para-ideology" reflecting not only journalists' class background and position in the societal power structure, but also the particular historical development of a national culture and journalistic tradition. Field theory shares with the hegemony approach of Stuart Hall, Todd Gitlin, and Daniel C. Hallin a concern with how macro-structures of media power are linked to organizational routines and journalistic practices.[50]

This concern with the intermediate level of society shares a certain affinity with at least some strains of American new institutionalism. Field theory may be compared to "new institutional" theories that also have conceptualized society in terms of semi-autonomous "institutional logics" or "social problem arenas."[51] In contrast to field theorists, however, new institutionalists tend to downplay economic power and power issues in general and they have not yet turned their attention to the news media. Some new institutionalists have called for a "synthesis of political and institutional approaches."[52] Field theory offers a promising step in that direction.

In general, the media field models positions itself between those approaches that commit the "short-circuit" fallacy and link cultural production directly to the interests of broad social classes or the national society, and those that focus too narrowly on cultural producers without taking seriously the structured relation between the field of cultural

production and its environment.[53] Field theory "Weberizes" media studies, while "structuralizing" Weber, by introducing the mediating social sphere of the journalistic "field" inside of which societal level conflicts are not simply reproduced, but refracted according to the specific logic of the field and the specific interests of professional journalists. As a result, field theory places greater emphasis than other approaches on such phenomena as competition over scoops, the "revue de presse" in which journalists monitor the stories of their colleagues at other media outlets, struggles over access to sources, changes in the relative prestige of various news organizations, etc.

The media field model's relational, spatial mode of thinking and historicized empirical approach could facilitate greater cross-national research on media systems.[54] In particular, comparative research could adopt the concept of field to conduct detailed structural mapping of national media fields in relation to other major societal fields. Researchers could then seek to show patterns in the relations between national fields of power and the internal logic and relations of power in each of their respective media fields.

One problem with the concept of field, however, may become more evident as researchers attempt to use it for comparative research. The main difficulty arises from the frequent elision between economic and political interests, as in the phrase, "the pole of political and economic power."[55] This formulation implies that the market and state work in tandem, whereas field theory's departure from vulgar Marxism would deny such a direct relation. Part of the problem in seeing the "state" in the Bourdieu school model is that it is defined operationally in at least three different ways for the case of France. In the first instance, the state, via its essential function of education, pervades contemporary western society at every level. Journalists, like all other social actors, owe certain essential characteristics of their worldview and their habitus to early state educational socialization, and their professional habitus, as noted, is influenced by state-sponsored or certified higher education.[56] Secondly, the state can be seen as largely synonymous with the field of power, or the struggle itself over the legitimate principle of vision and division in the social world.[57] In this regard, the news media, as in Gramsci, are not outside but within the state.

There is, however, a third and more limited way in which the state is conceptualized in field theory, and this is in terms of the specific fields of "politics" and of "the higher civil service" or the ensemble of bureau-

cratic fields.[58] Grouped along the societal economic/cultural continuum, these specific state fields lie closer to the economic pole than the university or literary fields, and in this sense, they can be incorporated within a model of two basic species of power. Yet, like all other fields, the political and bureaucratic fields involve their own specific interests and engage in the larger field of power for supremacy. This is where the binary structuralist logic seems inadequate. If, by definition, fields are not reducible to outside interests, but always have their own specific interests, then the fields of politics and bureaucracy cannot be subsumed with the economic field into a single "heteronomous" power that vies with "autonomous" journalistic power.

In principle, this question is to be resolved via empirical investigation: The issue is which form of capital – economic, bureaucratic, etc. – exerts the *dominant* outside power within the field. Field case studies have highlighted the increasing and now dominant heteronomous power of the economic pole (and the particularly intense economic pressure represented by television's audience meters) within the journalistic field. Champagne maintains that in contemporary western societies "political power is exerted on the press in the indirect form of economic power."[59] However, this strong claim leaves aside the host of ways, sometimes at cross purposes to the optimal functioning of the market, in which state bureaucracies wield power over the news media, such as libel and public disclosure laws and norms governing official source-reporter relations.[60] At other points, media field researchers acknowledge the complexity of field conflicts, but without addressing the contradictory implications for their binary model.

Here is where a direct dialogue between field theory and hegemony models could reap the greatest benefits: One could retain field theory's emphasis that news production is in the first instance a result of the competition within the journalistic field itself, or simply, that journalists have their own interests irreducible to outside interests. But these outside interests must be conceived of as themselves irreducible, multiple, and potentially contradictory. This conceptual adjustment may also require changes in the model's graphic representation, a cube or hexagon perhaps, rather than a square.

That said, the actual field analyses by Bourdieu, Champagne, and others raise important empirical research questions, especially for Americans. Having had a commercially-dominated radio-television system almost from the beginning in the United States, questions of the effects of

commercialization have seemed rather beside the point, if not quite difficult to study. The recent French experience, involving the relatively late privatization of radio and television, provides not only opportunities for comparative research with the United States, but opens up in general the question of commercialization that has for so long been foreclosed.[61] By the same token, it is difficult for Americans to assess the effects that the lack of a strong intellectual field has had on our public life: The decline of intellectuals and academia in France, at least since Jean-Paul Sartre's death in 1980, and the rise of journalists and media intellectuals in France provides another case study to illuminate what is lost when journalists largely displace intellectuals in public debate.

The notion of field also allows one to begin to consider global convergences in media organization and practices from a structural-relational perspective: As Bourdieu notes, for a field analysis to be complete, "one must take into account the position of a national media field in the world field and thus, for example, the economic and technical and especially symbolic domination of American television which is a model and a source of ideas, of formulas, and of procedures for many [French] journalists."[62] Thus, the similarities and differences in French and American journalism may be related not only to their separate national traditions, but to their hierarchically-structured relations in the world media system.

Media reception: complementing, not "resisting" production

A second area where field theory challenges the dominant paradigms of media studies is in the relation between the production and reception of news. Media researchers tend to study either the "objective" processes that generate media messages or the "subjective" processes of audience interpretation, but not both. The debate has thus arisen about the extent to which audiences are "active" in interpreting media messages, with political economy and to a lesser extent hegemony and cultural models concurring that audiences are relatively passive. In response, a number of audience studies pointed to the reality of audiences interpreting media messages in varied ways, but these researchers overstated their case by concluding that interpretation itself constituted resistance. Technological approaches, à la McLuhan, tend to take a highly determinist line.[63] Most news organizational studies ignore the issue of audiences.[64]

For Bourdieu and his colleagues, there is a basic homology between the producers and audiences for any given cultural product. Without any conscious attempt to match supply with demand (although this may be attempted as well), a new media outlet, simply by distinguishing itself and finding its own unique voice relative to the existing media enterprises, will also find its audience. This follows from the hypothesis that all of society is structured around the same basic division between economic and cultural capital. Thus, there is a "pre-established harmony between two systems of interests [production and reception] ... one only preaches to the converted."[65] To demonstrate this point, data are produced to demonstrate homologies between each class fraction's general cultural tastes, the class composition of the various media outlet audiences, and the general form and content of discourse in each media outlet.[66]

Causality is taken to be circular and mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, the supply side "always exerts an effect of symbolic imposition." A newspaper is a "constituted taste, a taste that has been raised from the vague semi-existence of half-formulated or unformulated experience" through the "work of professionals" (for taste, one could substitute "interpretation" or "position"). On the other hand, "every change in tastes resulting from a transformation of the conditions of existence and of the corresponding dispositions will tend to induce, directly or indirectly, a transformation of the field of production, by favoring the success, within the struggle constituting the field, of the producers best able to produce the needs corresponding to the new dispositions."[67] Resistance, to the extent that one can speak of such a term, is an inside game, produced within the field of small-scale production among avant-garde journalists, and among the corresponding fragments of the dominant classes, who in their own struggles for distinction, take up these new products.

How does the rise of commercial television change this equation? As an omnibus or large-scale commercial medium, television "secures success and the corresponding profits by adjusting itself to a pre-existing demand."[68] Thus, unlike the press of small-scale production, which to a certain extent is able to lead its readers while at the same time expressing the tastes of dominant class fractions, commercial television acts at this level to reinforce the societal consensus.[69] As cable television leads to the proliferation of news channels and programs, television may begin to operate more as an agent of class differentiation, as it already has in the United States.

The other crucial aspect of television's relationship with its audiences, for field theory, is television's current capacity, as opposed to the print press, to measure (a constructed form of) audience attention almost minute-by-minute. Because of this kind of intensified audience pressure, or rather the perception of the legitimacy of this measure of the audience, television favors dramatic, emotional, and spectacularized forms of political action, and/or a reduction in the overall amount of political news in favor of non-political news. Yet this is not simply a process of giving the "mass" audience what it wants. The mass audience itself is the result of a process of construction. Champagne analyzes how the "Audimat" audience-meter has produced a particular kind of public opinion, the instant agglomeration of half-formed sentiments, that devalorizes all other representations of the public will – such as popular demonstrations and representative organizations ranging from labor unions to anti-racist or environmental organizations – and has thus reduced society's "margin of relatively autonomous reflection and action."[70]

Intimately related to the production-reception problematic have been questions of the interpretation of meaning. Wendy Griswold, for instance, has contrasted "interpretive"-meaning oriented approaches with "institutional" approaches that ignore issues of meaning and reduce "cultural phenomena to univocal indicators of social institutions," including Bourdieu among the latter.[71] If anything, Bourdieu and his associates attempt to bridge the "interpretive" and "institutional." Field theory is concerned with how meaning is produced relationally, both via the play of difference among symbols and among the social agents who produce them. Of course, all messages, media generated or otherwise, are potentially "multi-vocal." But in practice, as the media field model emphasizes, messages are produced by particular producers for particular audiences, where the meanings, complex or otherwise, are understood if not always agreed upon.

Various critics have also pointed out that Bourdieu's "class-based" cultural production and consumption system may be only one way in which cultural goods circulate. According to field theory, cultural production emanating from the journalistic field is both homologous and relatively autonomous from demand, but the emphasis is ultimately on the parallel nature of production and consumption. In contrast to this largely reinforcing model, Paul DiMaggio separates out "ritual classification processes" that reflect social structure-generated demand, from three kinds of "classification processes" related to cultural production:

commercial classifications (comparable to field theory's large-scale production), professional classifications (comparable to small-scale production), and administrative classifications (which would incorporate state bureaucratic pressures not entirely taken into account by media field analyses).[72] DiMaggio offers an important critique of field theory, retaining the emphasis on the systematic nature of the relations between production and demand, while showing how multiple species of power complicate these relations and help account for variations across time and societies.

What remains indisputably valuable in the Bourdieu school approach is an injunction to think of the relation between any particular news outlet and its audience more in terms of mutual adjustment than of persuasion and resistance. And following from this, that the real locus of struggle over meaning lies not in the relation between any particular set of cultural producers and their audiences, but among fields of cultural production (both producers and homologous audiences) that vie among themselves over the power to produce legitimate knowledge about the social world.

News media and historical change

The third major contribution of field theory is that it emphasizes the issue of media change, both how change is generated within the media field and how the media field itself is able to produce societal change. This is somewhat ironic since Bourdieu has often been dismissed as a theorist of reproduction. In the political economy and cultural models, societal change in general is characterized as minimal and the media's role largely reinforcing. Hegemony studies tend to retain, in the last instance, the political economy model's Marxist functionalism or at least an emphasis on reproduction or limited change.[73] Organizational theories usually do not address the issue of change, partly because they have arisen out of ethnographic case studies.[74] Although technological theories do offer a theory of change, they normally focus on changes over the long-term and isolate new technologies from their social, economic, and political context.[75]

In field theory, changes in the structure of fields are produced from two basic sources. Since to exist in a field is "to differ,"[76] a "dialectic of distinction"[77] ensures the constant production of change as new actors attempt to enter and make their mark in the field. Upward and

particularly downward mobility, so-called "deviant trajectories," are another major source of mismatch between disposition (habitus) and position that may threaten to unsettle a field.[78] Finally, changes in closely related fields such as the university or politics, set in motion by their own internal dynamics, can have important cross-over effects on the journalistic field, and vice-versa.[79] These hypotheses about the inner- and intra-field dynamics could contribute to important new research directions for Anglo-American scholars.

But morphological changes will not have major effects, according to field theory, unless new entrants into the field are aided by a second kind of transformation: external factors such as "political breaks" or technological, economic, or demographic changes.[80] Bourdieu does insist on the powerful determinative effect of the economic field in the contemporary historical context, but offers the caveat that "the relations between fields ... are not defined once and for all, even in the most general tendencies of their evolution."[81] Pinto, in noting the "complex ensemble of relatively independent factors" driving changes in the philosophical field, emphasizes the kind of multicausality[82] argument that is most typical of media field studies. Despite Bourdieu's reputation as a grand theorist, his concepts of field, habitus, and capital are intended to be flexible tools for relatively open-ended empirical research. Ambivalence and lack of closure are thus partly intentional.[83]

Methodologically, field theory introduces the distinctive approach of the "field case-study," in which the media field's relationship with another field is examined systematically over a period of years or decades. This approach is usually combined with a "social [pre-]history" of the field, used as an "instrument of rupture" to help the analyst make strange the social world he or she after all also inhabits and takes for granted[84] and to show more clearly how the current state of the field is due to complex historical changes. This approach allows for the simultaneous analysis of changing media institutions and changing social problem definitions, too often separated in the Anglo-American context. Media field studies feature extensive theoretical reflections, detailed ethnographic descriptions, and telling anecdotes. One cannot help but wish at times, however, that they would more often supplement these elements with the kind of quantitative macro-data (on media ownership, percentages of revenues from advertising, numbers of journalists, trends in education and training, etc.) that they themselves argue is needed to understand fully field transformations. In some

studies, the "weight" of a media enterprise or medium, its power to influence other agents within a field, is asserted rather than assiduously documented.

For Bourdieu and his associates, the methodological and theoretical elements of their approach are linked to a political project. English-speaking scholars may have a hard time imagining intellectuals joining together to take collective control of the diffusion of their ideas. Yet if anything the rapid decline of serious news (far more "advanced" in the United States than in Europe) ought to prompt concerned academics, writers, and artists to criticize publicly and jointly the current state of mainstream journalism, to call for tougher FCC enforcement of television's obligation to serve the public interest, and to create new public spaces in which other logics than that of the market might prevail.

Researchers less interested in political action would still benefit from considering a number of field theory's important insights: to conceptualize the media as a field of relations, to explain news media content by the specific interests of the journalistic field as well as by reference to external pressures, to take into account how news production and reception mutually condition each other, and to examine institutional changes in the media itself and how these changes affect the social epistemological conditions for the production of scientific and political knowledge. The challenge remains to integrate French field theory with new institutional and other "spatial" theories to develop and refine further this exciting research paradigm.[85]

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Notes

1. Paul DiMaggio noted early on Bourdieu's affinities with American "cultural-organization" analysts such as himself, Paul Hirsch, and Richard Peterson. See Paul Dimaggio, "Review Essay: On Pierre Bourdieu," *American Journal of Sociology* 84/6 (1979): 1472. More recently, Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson credit Bourdieu's "interest in examining both the 'supply' of a cultural entity... and the 'demand' for it." See their "Introduction," in C. Mukerji and M. Schudson, editors, *Rethinking Popular Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 33–35. But these observations have prompted little follow-up research, and references to Bourdieu are especially rare in studies of news organizations.
2. The collective aspect of Bourdieu's project has always been visible in his research team's journal *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, but Bourdieu's debt to original research by Patrick Champagne and others is particularly marked in the domain of media studies. In this article, I focus on the following books and articles on the news media: Pierre Bourdieu, "L'emprise du journalisme," Rémi Lenoir, "La Parole est aux Juges: Crise de la magistrature et champ journalistique," Patrick Champagne, with Dominique Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte: A propos du 'scandale du sang contaminé,'" and Louis Pinto, "Le journalisme philosophique," all in the March 1994 (No. 101–102) special issue of *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, entitled "L'emprise du journalisme"; Alain Accardo, with G. Abou, G. Balbastre, and D. Marine, *Journalistes au quotidien: Essais de socioanalyse des pratiques journalistiques* (Bordeaux: Editions Le Mascaret, 1995); Pierre Bourdieu, *Champ politique, champ des sciences sociales, champ journalistique* (Cours du Collège de France à la Faculté d'anthropologie et de sociologie de l'Université Lumière, Lyon 2, November 14, 1995) and *Sur la télévision* (Paris: Liber-Raisons d'agir, 1996), recently published in English translation as *On Television* (New York: New Press, 1998); Patrick Champagne, "La construction médiatique des malaises sociaux," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* (December 1991) and "La double dépendance: Quelques remarques sur les rapports entre les champs politique, économique et journalistique," *Hermés* 17–18 (1995); and Louis Pinto, *L'intelligence en action: le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris: Éditions A.-M. Métailié, 1984). I also cite other Pierre Bourdieu works with theoretical or empirical points relevant to the news media. I do not extensively review here Patrick Champagne's related but somewhat separate project of research on the rise of opinion polling in France and how this has affected relations between the journalistic and political fields. See Patrick Champagne, *Faire l'opinion: le nouveau jeu politique* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1990), "La Vision d'État," in Pierre Bourdieu, editor, *La misère du monde* (Paris: Seuil, 1993), and "Pre-election opinion polls and democracy," translated by Grania Rogers, in Sheila Perry and Máire Cross, editors, *Voices of France: Social, Political and Cultural Identity* (London and Washington: Pinter, 1997). See also Pierre Bourdieu, "L'opinion publique n'existe pas," *Les Temps modernes* 318 (January 1973): 1292–1309, and "Opinion polls: a 'science' without a scientist," in P. Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 168–174.
3. Exceptions include the politically active Glasgow University Media Group and the Birmingham School of media researchers.
4. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 41.

5. Given that each field has its own irreducible logic, field theory tends to avoid terms like "sub-field," and thus speak of fields within fields.
6. Champagne, "La double dépendance," 223.
7. Figure 1 is adapted from Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 124. For other visual representations of the "Russian doll"-like relations among the field of class relations, field of power, and field of cultural production, see Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, 37–39, and David Swartz, *Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 136–140. See also Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "Artistic Field," in Michael Kelly, editor, *The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
8. Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 22.
9. Champagne, "La double dépendance," 216.
10. Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "Forward," in Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), xi. The exact hierarchical ordering of fields could of course vary among societies.
11. Accardo, *Journalistes au quotidien*, 21–23. For Bourdieu's earlier formulation, see Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
12. Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 25.
13. In *Journalistes au quotidien*, 48, Accardo concedes that the tension of living between two habitus for working-class journalists can contribute to the formation of a critical perspective toward standard journalistic practices, though such potentially subversive elements are normally overcome by the overwhelming bourgeois character of the media field. Journalists from high cultural or economic capital backgrounds are more likely to have the motivation and capacity to change the field based on the experience of their "deviant trajectories." On this general point, see Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 183–187.
14. Champagne, "La double dépendance," 217.
15. Accardo, *Journalistes au quotidien*, 43–44. In France, a particularly high proportion of television journalists have attended journalism schools. To the extent that this is also true in the United States, empirical investigation could determine its precise effects.
16. TF 1, or Télévision Française 1, is France's most watched television channel and since 1987 has been wholly privately-owned and funded. Arte is a joint Franco-German government funded cultural channel.
17. Champagne, "La double dépendance," 223, and "La construction médiatique des malaises sociaux."
18. Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 26.
19. Champagne, with Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte," 60.
20. Champagne, "La double dépendance," 226. This "intellectual" model, according to media field researchers, dominated the media field during the early post-war period but of course did not prevent episodes of sensationalistic coverage by some newspapers.
21. Champagne, "La double dépendance," 227.
22. Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 24; Champagne, "La construction médiatique des malaises sociaux," and "La double dépendance," 228.
23. Convergence among the fields might be conceptualized as an increase in homology, or the degree to which the fields are structured around the same relative proportions of cultural and economic capital. Or, thinking of the space as three-dimensional, the vertical space between the parallel fields could diminish, indicating not only a

similar structure but a greater back-and-forth between actual social agents from one field to the other.

24. Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 27.
25. Paul Beaud and Francesco Panese, in "From one galaxy to another: the trajectories of French intellectuals," *Media, Culture & Society* 17 (1995): 410, fn 3, report that the number of French university students increased from 150,000 in 1955 to 850,000 in 1985.
26. Pinto, "Le journalisme philosophique," 30.
27. Pinto, "Le journalisme philosophique," 27.
28. For a discussion of the creation of this new circuit of "culture intellectuelle moyenne," see Pinto, *L'intelligence en action*, 47–56.
29. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 70.
30. See Gisèle Sapiro, "La raison littéraire. Le champ littéraire français sous l'Occupation (1940–1944)", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 111–112 (March 1996): 3–35.
31. See Beaud and Panese, "From one galaxy to another," for further elaboration on this point.
32. See Pierre Bourdieu, "Analyse d'un passage à l'antenne," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1996. The show's producer, Daniel Schneidermann, wrote an equally lengthy "La télévision peut-elle critiquer la télévision?: Réponse à Pierre Bourdieu" in the May 1996 *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Bourdieu's negative experience with the show prompted him to develop his media critique further in two hour-long monologues produced by Collège de France/CNRS and shown on the cable channel Paris Première in May 1996. The 1996 book *Sur la télévision*, the edited transcript of these two shows, with the addendum "L'emprise du journalisme" reprinted from the March 1994 *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, is not only an intellectual critique but an "*intervention*" in the media-political sphere, an effort to circumvent the logic of journalism by beating the journalists at their own game.
33. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 30.
34. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 64.
35. Lenoir, "La Parole est aux Juges," 77.
36. Champagne, with Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte."
37. See, e.g., William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach," *American Journal of Sociology* 95/1 (1989): 1–37; Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, "Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction," *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994): 149–171; and Joseph R. Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
38. Champagne, with Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte," 52.
39. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 77.
40. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 78.
41. Pierre Bourdieu, editor, *La misère du monde*.
42. Serge Halimi, *Les nouveaux chiens de garde* (Paris: Liber-Raisons d'Agir, 1997). Bourdieu's increasing political activism and the extraordinary commercial success of the Liber/Raisons d'agir books is chronicled by Ariane Chemin, "Pierre Bourdieu devient la référence intellectuelle du 'mouvement social,'" *Le Monde*, May 8, 1998, pp. 1, 6.
43. Michael Schudson, in "The sociology of news production," *Media, Culture & Society* 11 (1989): 262–289, distinguishes three basic models: political economy, organizational, and culturological. Hegemony is perhaps closest to political economy, but incorporates elements of what I rename simply "cultural" models. Schudson also

mentions individualist studies. Individualist arguments represent not so much a competing model as the common-sense view against which all the aforementioned sociological schools are in part constructed. American critics of the "liberal" values of journalists draw on an individualist model of the media, implying that simply replacing individual liberal journalists with conservative or "objective" journalists would change media content and thus the media's overall societal influence. See, e.g., S. R. Lichter, S. Rothman, and L. S. Lichter, *The Media Elite: America's New Powerbrokers* (Bethesda, Md.: Adler and Adler, 1986). Technological theories of news production are noted by Herbert Gans in *Deciding What's News* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 79. Table I provides only the dominant characteristics of each model. Some exceptions are noted in the text and endnotes.

44. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 44. For strong political economy arguments, see, e.g., Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), and Herbert Schiller, "Transnational Media: Creating Consumers Worldwide," *Journal of International Affairs* 47 (1993). In France, field theory has been particularly concerned with distinguishing itself from Althusser's notion of the media as "ideological state apparatuses" that function without contradiction to reproduce capitalist control.
45. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 58. Régis Debray's notable history of French intellectuals, *Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France*, in fact owes much to Bourdieu's analysis of the increasing mediatization of the intellectual field. See Régis Debray, *Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France* (Paris: Editions Ramsay, 1979), translated into English as *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France* (London: Verso, 1981). Debray thanks Bourdieu in the forward to the book for having "spared the time to calm my scientific doubts" (p. 4). Noting Bourdieu's article, "Champ intellectuel et projet créateur," *Les Temps modernes* (November 1966), Debray admits: "The problematic of this text, which I discovered only recently, is so close to my own that I have gone over certain of my formulations and clarified them as a result of reading it" (p. 79). Page numbers are from the English edition. Gilles Deleuze's analysis of media intellectuals is cited favorably by both Debray in *Le Pouvoir intellectuel* and by Bourdieu in *Sur la télévision*: Deleuze's view that journalism has created "a new type of thought: interview-thought, conversation-thought, instant thought" is very similar to Bourdieu's references to "fast thinking" and "throw-away thought" (*pensée jetable*) (See Gilles Deleuze, from an "unpublished and privately-circulated article," cited in Debray, 1981, 92–93). However, Debray's more recent theoretical works on *médiologie*, an eclectic blend of McLuhanite technologism, the semiology of Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco, and the history of mentalités, no longer have much affinity with Bourdieu's project. See Debray, *Cours de médiologie générale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991) and *Media Manifestos: On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms* (London: Verso, 1996). For the classic "strong" technological view that new technologies promote new forms of human consciousness and are the primary engine of social change, see Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media* (New York: Penguin, 1964). Field theory does not, however, entirely discount technology as a factor. See, e.g., Champagne, "La double dépéndance," and Champagne, with Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte." For another multi-causal model of media analysis that incorporates but does not refer solely to technological factors, see Manuel Castells's three-volume *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996–98).
46. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 68.
47. Dominique Wolton, *Éloge du grand public: Une théorie critique de la télévision*

(Paris: Flammarion, 1990), 9. See also Dominique Wolton and Jean-Louis Missika, *La folle du logis: la télévision dans les sociétés démocratiques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983). Wolton, *Éloge du grand public*, 10, cites as his influences the "empirical perspective" of Paul Lazarsfeld, Joseph Klapper, and Elihu Katz, researchers best known for downplaying media power and emphasizing the capacity of audiences to freely interpret media messages.

48. Bourdieu, "L'emprise du journalisme," reprinted in *Sur la télévision*, 88. Wolton has also co-authored a book with Michel Wieviorka, the director of the center of "interventionist" sociology of social movements founded by Alain Touraine. Although Wieviorka and Touraine have not written extensively on the media, their view of the sociologist as "public intellectual" rather than as social scientist and their frequent newspaper writings and appearances on television differ with Bourdieu's insistence that sociology preserve its independence from the mass media. See Michel Wieviorka, "Intellectuals, Not Professionals: Sociology in France," *Contemporary Sociology* 26 (1997): 288–292.
49. Many of the classic early studies, such as those by Gaye Tuchman, Harvey Molotch, and Marilyn Lester, were heavily influenced by the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, via Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. They were chiefly concerned with showing that news was in fact "constructed" rather than reflecting some reality "out there." Edward Jay Epstein's study of television news had the slightly more modest goal of showing that news was produced by organizations, rather than reflecting the views or idiosyncrasies of individual journalists. See, e.g., Gaye Tuchman, *Making News* (New York: The Free Press, 1978); Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973); Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester, "News as Purposive Behavior: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events, Scandals and Rumors," *American Sociological Review* 39 (1974): 101–112; Edward Jay Epstein, *News from Nowhere: Television and the News* (New York: Random House, 1973); and Mark Fishman, *Manufacturing the News* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980). More recently, Mark Pedelty's *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995) links an ethnographic organizational approach to a theoretical framework that draws on Foucault and Althusser.
50. See, e.g., Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978); Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World is Watching* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), and "Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm," *Theory and Society* 6 (1978): 205–253; and Daniel Hallin, *"The Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Gans's analysis also has at least implicit affinities with hegemony theories. In the final analysis, he stresses the importance of official sources that convey the views of dominant power. See Gans, *Deciding What's News*, 281–285. Bourdieu and his associates have entertained a fruitful dialogue in particular with Raymond Williams and scholars associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies such as Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige, and Paul Willis (see P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 80–81). Champagne and Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte," 46, seem to make a hegemony-style argument when they say that the news media's power to define social problems derives from "the fact that [the media's vision] is close to that pre-existing in the popular consciousness."
51. Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols,

Practices, and Institutional Contradictions," in W.W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio, editors, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), and Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, "A Political-Cultural Approach to the Problem of Strategic Action," revised paper, originally presented to the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 1990. See also Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in W.W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism*.

52. Friedland and Alford, "Bringing Society Back In," 244, citing Paul J. DiMaggio, "Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory," in L. G. Zucker, editor, *Institutional Patterns and Organizations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 3–22. DiMaggio and Powell, "Introduction," 38, fn 29, comment on new institutionalism's affinities with Gramsci and how hegemony theory addresses issues of power largely ignored by the new institutionalists. DiMaggio and Powell (ibid., fn 28) also note a "natural affinity between Bourdieu's ideas and neoinstitutional theory." They lament that there is much room for a 'dialogue' between 'the Marxian tradition' and new institutionalism that "has not yet taken place" (ibid., fn 29), though one could argue that Bourdieu's theories offer precisely this kind of dialogue. See T. Cook, *Governing with the News* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), for a recent new institutionalist analysis of the media that doesn't, however, mention Bourdieu.
53. For discussion of the short-circuit fallacy, see Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, 181, 188. In this regard, the Bourdieu school contrasts itself in particular with the work of György Lukács, Lucien Goldmann, and Theodor Adorno. Wendy Griswold's model of cultural analysis, which includes the cultural producer's immediate "social categories and groups," potentially incorporates the specific professional interests of cultural producers emphasized by field theory, but Griswold does not emphasize these specific interests nor how they differ or relate to other proximate institutional or social group influences. See Wendy Griswold, "A Methodological Framework for the Sociology of Culture," *Annual Review of Sociology* (1987), esp. 20–26, and "The Fabrication of Meaning: Literary Interpretation in the United States, Great Britain, and the West Indies," *American Journal of Sociology* 92/5 (March 1987), 1077–1117.
54. A number of media researchers have noted the severe shortage of comparative studies of media systems. See, e.g., Michael Schudson, "The sociology of news production," and Stephen Hilgartner and Charles L. Bosk, "The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model," *American Journal of Sociology* 94/1 (1988): 53–78. For discussion of the problems of cross-national media research and the need to "think structurally," see J. G. Blumler, J. M. McLeod, and K. E. Rosengren, editors, *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture Across Space and Time* (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage, 1992), especially chapters 1 and 12. As Loïc J. D. Wacquant notes, "Forward," *The State Nobility*, xiii, it is not Bourdieu's specific empirical findings about the French field of power, but the "relational mode of thinking encapsulated by the notion of field" that should be transposed to research in other national contexts. Cross-national research could also aid in fine-tuning field theory's conceptual tools. For instance, the United States and France have historically differed in their conceptions of autonomous journalism, with American journalism idealizing the uncovering of official corruption and the French valuing subtlety of intellectual expression. Ethnocentric definitions of autonomy may be one reason why Bourdieu and his colleagues have not paid much attention to the ways in which the French bureaucracy has created strong legal

obstacles to investigative journalism, just as many American researchers are not overly concerned with the American news media's anti-intellectualism. Increased cross-national research could help domestic researchers overcome the "blind spots" imposed upon them by the fact that they cannot help but share many of the taken-for-granteds of the society they are attempting to study.

55. Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 38. See also Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 23, 26–27. In part, this elision may reflect the existence of a relatively unified power structure in France.
56. For the primacy of education in Bourdieu's understanding of the state, see Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory* 12/1 (March 1994), 1–18; and with Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 113–115.
57. Champagne, "La vision d'État" and Bourdieu, "Rethinking the State," 4–5.
58. E.g., Bourdieu, in "Rethinking the State," 15–16, emphasizes "specialized [state] agents and their specific interests" and the "specific functioning of the bureaucratic microcosm."
59. Champagne, "La double dependance," 219.
60. See Daniel C. Hallin, *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the Public Sphere* (New York: Routledge, 1994) for thoughtful analysis of the changing and often contradictory power relations between the American news media and political parties, the state and the economy.
61. But see John H. McManus, *Market-Driven Journalism* (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1994) for a careful examination of the effects of intensified economic pressures on American television news and by extension on print journalism. McManus's analysis in some ways parallels field theory, exploring for instance the tension between "journalistic and market logics."
62. Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*, 47.
63. Advocates of the Internet and new computer technologies, represented by the magazine *Wired*, are fierce champions of audience "freedom," but these "new media" lie outside the scope of the field theorists' current research. For a review and analysis of the passive-active audience debate, see Joshua Gamson, *Claims to Fame: Celebrity in Contemporary America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 186–215. Gamson does in fact attempt to analyze both cultural production and reception, but ultimately sides with a version of the active audience model, ignores issues of class stratification, and, on the basis of varying "readings" of the meaning of media celebrity, concludes over-optimistically that audiences are a potential source of democratic renewal.
64. For one notable exception of a cultural-organizational approach that also examines audiences, see Gans, *Deciding What's News*, particularly 214–248.
65. Bourdieu, *Distinction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 239–240. See also Louis Pinto, *L'intelligence en action*, 27, in which he argues that in taking a position vis-à-vis its news magazine competitors during the mid-1960s and early 1970s, *Le Nouvel Observateur* also situated itself in relation to its "actual and potential audience" composed of the growing group of university students and graduates.
66. Pinto, *L'intelligence en action*, especially 21–79; Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 440–453. See also Pierre Bourdieu, "The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods," *Media, Culture and Society* 2 (1980), especially 272–273.
67. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 231.

68. Bourdieu, "The Production of Belief," 268.
69. Media field researchers have not yet examined closely the relationship between television news production and *specific* audiences, which may in fact have important consequences. Gans, for instance, found significant differences between the American audiences for television news shows and national news magazines during the 1970s.
70. Patrick Champagne, "La loi des grands nombres: Mesure de l'audience et représentation politique du public," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 101–102 (March 1994), 10–22. See also Bourdieu, *Sur la télévision*.
71. Wendy Griswold, "A Methodological Framework for the Sociology of Culture," 2. See also, Griswold, "The Fabrication of Meaning: Literary Interpretation in the United States, Great Britain, and the West Indies," 1080–1081.
72. See, in particular, Paul DiMaggio, "Classification in Art," *American Sociological Review* 52 (1987): 440–455. DiMaggio and Bourdieu share the project, as yet unfulfilled in news media research, of taking seriously the complex links between the supply and consumption of culture.
73. Daniel C. Hallin, in an analysis of changing American television framing of foreign policy conflicts since Vietnam, explicitly rejects a functionalist version of hegemony. His study, nevertheless, concludes that a "hegemonic process can clearly be seen at work, holding communication within limits relatively less threatening to the established order." See Hallin, *We Keep America on Top of the World*, 80–81.
74. As Schudson notes in "The sociology of news production," 279, the major Anglo-American approaches are "often inclined to ignore the possibilities for change in the nature of newswork" and "historical studies of the press reveal significantly different patterns of newsgathering and newswriting over time that are rarely referenced or accounted for in contemporary sociological studies of news." For a Habermas-influenced model of media change and social change, see Daniel C. Hallin, *We Keep America on Top of the World*, esp. 1–39. For a neo-Parsonsian perspective, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, "The Mass News Media in Systemic, Historical and Comparative Perspective," in Elihu Katz and Tamás Szecskö, editors, *Mass Media and Social Change* (London: Sage, 1981), 17–51. In general, Bourdieu opposes his theory of fields to the functionalism, organicism, and "immanent self-development" evident in many versions of systems theory. See Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 102–104.
75. For this critique see, e.g., Raymond Williams, *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975).
76. Bourdieu, *Champ politique*, 21.
77. Bourdieu, *Rules of Art*, 154.
78. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 183–186.
79. See, e.g., Champagne, with Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte," 50–52; Bourdieu, "Champ politique," 6.
80. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, 57–58; Champagne, "La double dependance," 217; Champagne, with Marchetti, "L'information médicale sous contrainte," 40.
81. Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 110. Beaud and Panese, "From one galaxy to another," 410, fn 8, argue that the Bourdieu-inspired studies emphasize external market influences. But this is to ignore the frequent reference to morphological and other changes not strictly reducible to market influences. For example, Bourdieu, in *Distinction*, 594, fn 52, explains the 1970s decline of the politically and stylistically conservative *Le Figaro* and *L'Aurore*, with

their low proportion of young readers, and the rise of the left-leaning *Le Monde* and *Le Nouvel Observateur*, as "very directly reflect[ing] the morphological changes in the dominant class in favor of fractions richest in educational capital."

82. Pinto, "Le journalisme philosophique," 26. In this regard, too, field theorists and new institutionalists share common ground. Fligstein and McAdam, "A Political-Cultural Approach to the Problem of Strategic Action," list the "heterogeneity of its causal mechanisms" as one of the defining features of new institutional approaches.
83. In general, the media field model focuses less on explaining external factors than on how these factors are "translated" by the internal logic of the news media field (and then, how this translated logic is translated into other related fields). Thus field theory, despite its emphasis on television commercialization, does not ask: Why and how were increased commercial pressures introduced into the French news media field in the first place? Why did television and radio privatization occur under a socialist president? And why did the privatization proceed along some lines rather than others?
84. Champagne, *Faire l'opinion*, 38.
85. For general efforts in this direction, see, e.g., L. Spillman, "Culture, Social Structures, and Discursive Fields," *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 1/15 (1995), 129–154; and I. Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries," *Social Research* 62/2 (Summer 1995).